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Abstract
We study the impact of the ownership structure of a corporation on the characteristics
and eﬃciency of the market for corporate control. We adopt a general mechanism design ap-
proach, in which endogenous sources of ineﬃciency in the market, including adverse selection,
moral hazard, budget balance and voluntary trading, may preclude the possibility of eﬃciently
restructuring control and ownership. We identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an eﬃ-
cient market, and describe the characteristics of eﬃcient restructuring mechanisms, when they
exist. In eﬃcient restructuring, corporations typically increase the number of shares of the in-
cumbent manager when he remains in control, or give him a generous golden parachute when he
is deposed. Corporations are also reluctant to assign full control and full ownership to a single
stockholder, unless agency costs are severe. We characterize the set of ownership structures
for which eﬃcient restructuring is possible. While the distribution of ownership among the
non-controlling shareholders is irrelevant, the level of initial managerial ownership is a central
determinant of this set. Typically, eﬃcient restructuring is easier to obtain for low levels of
managerial ownership.
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The governance structure of the modern corporation is concerned with two main problems, the
assignment of the right people to management and the eﬃcient provision of incentives to managers.
The former problem stems from adverse selection, while the latter stems from moral hazard. Both,
however, arise from the separation of control from ownership, a deﬁning characteristic of the modern
corporation. When internal corporate governance mechanisms fail, the market for corporate control
arises as one possible solution for dealing with these problems. Due to external pressure, ﬁrms
frequently restructure, by ﬁring and hiring managers and reallocating ownership, and are sometimes
taken over. We seek to explain these phenomena by studying the operation of the market for
corporate control and how the structure of ownership aﬀects its eﬃciency.
To do so, we apply the tools of mechanism design to the problem of corporate restructuring.
Thus, rather than analyzing the characteristics of speciﬁc mechanisms to transfer control, we let the
market for corporate control choose the most eﬃcient one. Under this approach, the eﬃciency of
the market is hampered by adverse selection, moral hazard, budget balance and voluntary trading.
Because of the fundamental, endogenous nature of these sources of friction, our conclusions are
likely to be robust across diﬀerent institutional environments.
We start by noting that either the adverse selection or the moral hazard problem, if taken
in isolation, is trivially solved and the ﬁrst-best allocation is obtained. When both problems are
present, however, eﬃcient restructuring of control and ownership may not be feasible. That is,
there may be no ex post share rule (i.e., an allocation of ownership shares to all shareholders,
conditional on the assignment of control) for which an incentive compatible, individually rational
mechanism implements the eﬃcient assignment of control and satisﬁes budget balance.
Indeed, our main results deﬁne necessary and suﬃcient conditions that characterize when a
corporation can be eﬃciently restructured. The key to these conditions is the optimal share rule,
so named because it implements the ﬁrst-best allocation if and only if such an outcome is feasible.
The properties of this share rule, which value-maximizing corporations will use, have strong positive
implications for the nature of corporate restructuring in general. First, this rule treats the manager
and the non-controlling shareholders very diﬀerently, typically giving the manager more shares.
For example, when the manager is replaced, he receives a “golden parachute” that is set high
speciﬁcally to make him willing to participate in the restructuring mechanism in the ﬁrst place.
Second, under this share rule managerial ownership does not converge. It never decreases when the
manager retains control, but often decreases when a non-controlling shareholder assumes control.
Third, the optimal share rule speciﬁes complete dissolution, where the ﬁrm becomes fully owned
and managed by a sole proprietor, if and only if agency costs are severe. Thus, our theory oﬀers
1an entirely novel explanation for the persistence of the separation of control from ownership and a
prediction for when they are likely to be combined.
Perhaps more importantly, the optimal share rule also allows us to characterize the set of ex
ante ownership structures for which eﬃcient restructuring is possible. We show that, while the ex
ante level of managerial ownership is a crucial determinant of this set, the ex ante distribution of
ownership among the non-controlling shareholders does not matter. We also show that eﬃcient
restructuring is usually more likely to be achieved when the initial managerial ownership is low. As
long as the number of shareholders is suﬃciently large, eﬃcient restructuring is possible if and only
if managerial ownership is suﬃciently small. For higher levels of managerial ownership, management
entrenchment eﬀects preclude eﬃciency.
This paper contributes also to the broader mechanism design literature. Since buyer/seller
exchange is a special type of restructuring and a special case of our model, we are able to generalize
the analysis of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) to the simultaneous exchange of control and
ownership. We show that, when control and ownership can be separated, eﬃcient bilateral exchange
of control is actually possible for identical, continuous types of buyer and seller. However, this is
possible only if the full separation of ownership and control introduces no agency costs.
Collecting these results, we conclude that the goals of providing incentives to managers and
facilitating control transfers conﬂict with each other. Speciﬁcally, ex ante ownership structures that
tend to mitigate agency costs also tend to exacerbate the problem of management entrenchment.
Thus, too few changes of control may occur whenever the market for corporate control must deal
with both moral hazard and adverse selection.
Because ownership structure aﬀects both agency costs and the functioning of the market for
corporate control, ﬁrm value depends on the ownership structure. Our analysis indicates that this
relationship is quite robust. Under the ex ante structure, if managerial ownership is too low, agency
costs reduce ﬁrm value. Upon restructuring, if managerial ownership is too high, the market for
corporate control is ineﬃcient, and ex post ﬁrm value is reduced.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain how our paper ﬁts in
the relevant literature. In Section 3, we describe the model and give some important preliminary
results. In Section 4, we identify the optimal mechanism, discuss its properties and analyze the
relationship between ownership structure and frictions in the market for corporate control. In
Section 5, we discuss an example that illustrates our main points. Section 6 provides a discussion
of the results and some concluding remarks.
22 Related Literature
Our mechanism design approach owes its greatest debt to Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987),
the ﬁrst paper to study eﬃcient dissolution of partnerships in the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion.1 However, our two departures from their framework, the separation of control from ownership
and the possibility of agency costs, are quite signiﬁcant.2 Given these changes, allocative eﬃciency
depends both on the assignment of control and on a suﬃciently high level of ex post managerial
ownership. This greatly expands the set of share rules capable of potentially implementing the
ﬁrst-best, as eﬃciency no longer requires reducing the ﬁrm to single ownership. The optimal share
rule is chosen from this set, essentially, to make it as easy as possible to satisfy budget balance.
In corporate ﬁnance theory, few papers directly study the eﬀect of ownership structures on
the functioning of the market for corporate control. To explain their empirical ﬁndings of a non-
monotonic relationship between management ownership and ﬁrm value, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny
(1988) oﬀer an informal theory on the trade-oﬀ between managerial incentives and entrenchment. In
contrast, Stulz (1988) provides a formal theory on the trade-oﬀ between higher takeover premia and
the probability of takeover, but takeover activity is not aimed at correcting sub-optimal ownership
structures in his analysis, as it is in this paper.
Numerous authors have studied how ownership aﬀects ﬁrm value, but there remains wide dis-
agreement on the issue. In their seminal contribution, Berle and Means (1932) argue that separating
control from ownership is detrimental for ﬁrm value because managers who are not owners will not
be guided by proﬁt-maximizing motives. Jensen and Meckling (1976) strengthen this vision by
showing that the imperfect alignment of incentives between (controlling and owning) managers
and (owning) shareholders fosters a value-reducing agency problem, which could nevertheless be
mitigated if managers held stock. In contrast, Demsetz (1983) argues that a well-functioning mar-
ket for corporate control tempers the agency problem. At a minimum, it renders it a short-term
phenomenon. Proﬂigate managers can be replaced, so current managers’ incentives for austerity
are enhanced. Generally inept managers can be replaced, too. Therefore, as long as the market
for corporate control eﬃciently replaces such underperformers, a ﬁrm’s value will not depend on
its ownership structure.3 If the ownership structure itself aﬀects frictions in that market, however,
1This seminal paper led to extensive work on dissolving partnerships. See for example McAfee (1992), Fieseler,
Kittsteiner and Moldovanu (2001) and Moldovanu (2002).
2Ornelas and Turner (2004) also separate ownership and control, but study only the problem of fully dissolving
partnerships.
3Empirically, several authors ﬁnd that ownership structure “matters” for ﬁrm performance: see Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995), Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999), Habib and
Ljungqvist (2003), Adams and Santos (2003) and McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2003). On the other hand, many
3it also aﬀects the feasible ways in which ﬁrms can restructure and, consequently, ﬁrm value. Thus,
our ﬁnding of a robust relationship between ownership and the eﬃciency of the market indicates
that ownership is indeed value-relevant.
This paper is closely related also to the literature on possible failures of the market for corporate
control, initiated with the seminal work of Grossman and Hart (1980). In their paper, an outside
raider, who could acquire control and replace the incumbent manager with a superior one, will
refrain from doing so if small non-controlling shareholders refuse to tender their shares in a takeover
bidding game in which the tender price is set below the post-takeover share price. Because of free-
riding behavior of small shareholders, “too few” changes in control occur.
Grossman and Hart’s arguments suggest that the initial ownership of shares aﬀects eﬃciency.
For example, the size of the stakes of non-controlling shareholders aﬀect their incentives to free-ride,
while a large initial ownership stake by a single bidder also helps against the free-riding problem
(Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Other related papers analyze the eﬀects of toeholds on the ex post
eﬃciency of private-value bidding mechanisms (Burkart 1995; Singh 1998) or common-value ones
(Bulow, Huang and Klemperer 1999). Burkart et al. (1998) analyze a related but diﬀerent problem:
the existence of agency problems with the new controlling party after a takeover will make the
post-takeover ownership structure relevant for ﬁrm value. In sum, the literature on tender oﬀers in
general implies that the ownership structure of a ﬁrm will have eﬀects on the functioning of market
mechanisms to restructure ownership and control.
In our view, the results in this literature, while insightful, are vulnerable to the critique of
Demsetz (1983): if a speciﬁc takeover mechanism does not lead to an eﬃcient outcome, why not
use a diﬀerent one?4 For example, Grossman and Hart (1980) show that if dilution of original
shareholders is possible, the free-riding problem is eliminated. Although dilution is illegal in the
U.S., M¨ uller and Panunzi (2004) show that the same outcome can be achieved when the raider
ﬁnances its acquisition by issuing debt backed by the target’s future cash-ﬂows. They argue that
these “bootstrap acquisitions” are legal and were also widely used in the takeover wave of the 1980s.
Our approach, by contrast, is not subject to Demsetz’s critique. In appealing to the revelation
principle, we permit the use of any restructuring mechanism. Thus, our ﬁnding that ownership is
value-relevant is robust to all available mechanisms.
The meaning of the expression “market for corporate control” varies in the literature. While
others ﬁnd no robust empirical support for the value-relevance of ownership structures: for example, Demsetz and
Lehn (1985), Loderer and Martin (1997), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)
and Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2003).
4Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (2000) and Bebchuk and Hart (2001) provide comparative analyses of two diﬀerent
mechanisms.
4some reserve this term to the speciﬁc mechanism of hostile tender oﬀers, we use the term as
originally deﬁned by Manne (1965), who views corporate control as an asset that can be bought
and sold.5 Thus, transactions in this market do not have to imply hostility, or the use of any
speciﬁc mechanism. Consistent with this view, Manne considered friendly mergers to be the most
common, and probably the most eﬃcient, mechanism for taking over control (pp. 117-19).6
3 The Model
We analyze the problem of simultaneously assigning control to the most able manager and assign-
ing him suﬃciently high ownership to preclude agency costs–i.e., to prevent the manager from
(ineﬃciently) diverting the ﬁrm’s proﬁts for private gain. After describing the setup of the model,
we ﬁrst show that, in the absence of direct costs of restructuring, this problem is trivial either
if information about managerial abilities is public or if agency costs do not arise for any level of
managerial ownership, but that when both information is private and agency costs are a potential
problem, the set of eﬃcient restructuring mechanisms is restricted and may be empty. We then
provide conditions that identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions for when a corporation may be
restructured.
3.1 Setup
An all-equity ﬁrm is initially owned by n risk-neutral shareholders indexed by i ∈ N ≡ {1,...,n}.
Shareholder i owns a fraction ri ∈ [0,1] of shares, where
Pn
i=1 ri =1 . Ownership does not imply
control over the decisions taken within the ﬁrm. Instead, the ﬁrm resembles a modern corporation,
in that a team of professional managers is in charge of running it. Since we wish to abstract from
conﬂicts of interest within the management team, we model this team as a single individual with
full control. We refer to the initial manager as shareholder 1. Thus, r1 is our measure of managerial
ownership.
We denote the general ability of shareholder i in running the ﬁrm by ai.7 We assume that
ai is distributed according to an increasing, continuous and diﬀerentiable distribution function F
5This deﬁnition is also broadly consistent with Jensen and Ruback’s (1983) view of the market for corporate
control.
6Corporate restructuring activity is usually achieved by the combination of many diﬀerent transactions in the
market for corporate control with managerial initiatives to refocus the ﬁrm towards a more eﬃcient allocation of
corporate assets (see Jensen 1987, 1988).
7We treat ai as a measure of managerial talent, but other interpretations are also possible. For example, ai might
be considered a measure of shareholder i’s ability to identify the right people to actually run the business.
5with support [a,a]. The assumption of a common distribution is made to simplify exposition.8
Managerial talent is private information. Thus, shareholder i knows his own ability ai, but any
shareholder j 6= i knows only the distribution of ai. The expected value of ai is denoted by µ.
Some shareholders might have no managerial skills and thus have a very low ai.H o w e v e r ,t h e r e
might be also very good potential managers who are not shareholders of the ﬁrm. Now, because we
deﬁne as shareholders any individual i owning a fraction ri ∈ [0,1] of the ﬁrm–even if ri =0 – i n
principle any individual in this economy could be considered a shareholder. Thus, our approach is
indeed very general; any potential candidate for becoming a manager must be included in the set
of n shareholders.
We consider a simple technology in which proﬁt is a linear function of the manager’s ability.
Thus, under the initial control structure and in the absence of agency costs, the manager knows
that proﬁtw i l lb eπ = a1, whereas the non-controlling shareholders expect proﬁt E [a1]=µ.I f
upon restructuring shareholder i becomes the manager, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt becomes π = ai.
Managers may have, however, private incentives to divert company proﬁts to themselves. We
model the extraction of private gains similarly to Burkart et al. (1998). Speciﬁcally, the man-
ager uses a share γ of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt to produce ”share” δ(γ) for himself, which can be under-
stood as perquisites that the manager consumes, leaving the residual share 1 − γ to be divided
among the shareholders. Thus, under the ex ante ownership structure, the manager’s payoﬀ is
[δ(γ)+( 1− γ)r1]a1 and shareholder i0sp a y o ﬀ is (1−γ)ria1. The allocation of corporate resources
γ is a choice variable to the manager. We follow the technical assumptions of Burkart et al. (1998)
that δ (·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave in [0,1], with boundary con-
ditions δ (0) = 0 and δ0 (1) = 0. However, we relax their other assumptions in two important ways.
First, we permit the marginal gain of initial extraction, δ0(0), to be anywhere in [0,1]. Second, we
require δ(γ) to be strictly concave only if δ0(0) > 0. Thus, we include a wide spectrum of speciﬁ-
cations of private gains, including the case where no private gains are available (δ(γ)=0 ) . N o t e
that these assumptions guarantee ineﬃcient extraction of private beneﬁts, since δ (γ) < γ for all
γ > 0. Thus, the speciﬁcation of Burkart et al.’s for the extraction of private gains corresponds to
the special case of ours where δ0 (0) = 1.9
8If shareholders have past observations of the manager’s performance, for example, they could in principle use
them to update their beliefs about managerial ability. A natural way to incorporate this into our model is to permit
the ex ante distribution of the manager’s ability to be diﬀerent than the ex ante distribution of the other shareholders.
As long as the support of each ai is the same, however, our main results would be unaﬀected by this change.
9See Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) for an alternative, but equivalent, modeling approach to ineﬃcient extraction
of private beneﬁts.
6An incumbent manager chooses to divert proﬁts to private gains as to maximize his payoﬀ:
max
γ∈[0,1]
[δ (γ)+( 1− γ)r1]a1. (1)
Therefore, the optimal choice of γ is given by
γ∗ =
(
h(r1)i f δ0(0) >r 1




δ0¢−1.T h u s ,f o rs u ﬃciently small r1, the manager diverts proﬁts for his private gain.
Since δ (γ) < γ, this introduces agency costs. Notice that, given our assumptions, the (privately)
optimal share of proﬁts that the manager extracts does not depend on his ability, but is non-
increasing in his ownership share. Moreover, γ∗ =0i fr1 = 1 and, unless δ(γ)=0 , γ∗ =1i f
r1 =0 .10 Thus, agency costs are absent for all r1 only if δ(γ)=0 .
The timing of events is as follows. There is an initial, exogenous allocation of control and of
ownership, r = {r1,r 2,...,r n}.11 After ownership and control are allocated, each shareholder learns
his ability. They then write a multilateral contract to reallocate ownership and control among
themselves. Under the rules of this contract, they implement a new allocation of shares and control
rights. Finally, production takes place and the ﬁrm generates proﬁt (gross of agency costs) π = aj,
where j is the index of the (potentially) new manager in charge. We refer to this sequence of events
as the operation of a restructuring mechanism, which is a procedure to change the original structure
of ownership and control. We refer to the set of available restructuring mechanisms as constituting
the market for corporate control.
3.2 The restructuring problem
Suppose that there was no scope for agency costs (δ(γ) = 0) and no private information. It
is then obvious that, without direct costs of restructuring, the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient allocation can
always be achieved, with control being assigned to the most talented shareholder regardless of
the initial ownership and control structures. This is, in fact, a simple illustration of the Coase
Theorem. Unlike previous models of the market for corporate control, ours does not restrict the set
of contracts available to shareholders–they are free to restructure ownership and control as they
wish. Thus, it is natural that ex ante ownership will be irrelevant and eﬃcient restructuring will
always be achieved in our setup in the absence of direct transaction costs. The expected surplus
from restructuring in this case is the ﬁrst best, V fb ≡ E(e a − a1), where ˜ a ≡ max{a1,...,a n}.T h e
surplus from restructuring under asymmetric information is thus necessarily no higher than V fb.
10If δ(γ)=0 , the manager with r1 = 0 is indiﬀerent between any level of private extraction.
11We adopt the convention that bold variables represent vectors.
7However, even when shareholders’ talent is private information, fully-eﬃcient restructuring
remains possible. We illustrate this possibility using a particularly simple mechanism.
Deﬁnition 1 The trivial restructuring mechanism has the following characteristics. After
learning his ability ai, each shareholder simultaneously announces his type. The mechanism assigns
control to the agent who reports the highest ability ˜ a, while the ownership structure r remains intact
throughout.
It is immediate to see that the trivial mechanism yields a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, where all
shareholders truthfully report their abilities.12 This mechanism implements the ﬁrst-best allocation
of control, the participation constraints of all shareholders are met and the mechanism has a
balanced budget. Thus, adverse selection per se is not a problem for eﬃcient restructuring, as long
as contracts are complete.
Now let the manager have the power to divert some corporate resources to his private con-
sumption. Generally, this will happen if internal control mechanisms have failed.13 Nevertheless, if
information about abilities were not private, it would be simple to rearrange ownership and control
to eliminate agency costs completely.
Thus, notwithstanding direct costs of restructuring, implementing an eﬃcient allocation of
ownership and control is diﬃcult only if both private information (adverse selection) and agency
costs (moral hazard) are present. In that case, since the manager’s incentives to divert company
proﬁts are stronger, the smaller is his ownership share, the problem of value maximization requires
not only assigning the right person to management, but also making sure that this person’s equity
stake is large enough that he does not divert proﬁts. The trivial mechanism can then be expected
to yield V fb only if the initial ownership share of each shareholder is suﬃciently high to preclude
him from diverting proﬁts if he happens to become the new manager. If initial ownership shares
do not satisfy that requirement (and they typically do not), ownership will need to be reassigned
in any eﬃcient restructuring mechanism to guarantee a suﬃciently high manager’s share.
3.3 Mechanisms for eﬃcient allocation of ownership and control
Here we start analyzing how eﬃcient restructuring can be achieved when both adverse selection
and moral hazard problems are present.
Ac o r p o r a t i o nhr,F,δi is fully characterized by its ex ante ownership structure r, by the distri-
bution of managerial abilities F and by how private beneﬁts may be extracted, represented by δ.
12This actually yields a Groves equilibrium, where truthful reporting is a dominant strategy if each ri > 0.
13For example, the manager may have succeeded in eﬀectively capturing the board of directors.
8Our problem is the eﬃcient restructuring of the ownership and control of such corporations. Using
the revelation principle, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to direct revelation
mechanisms in which shareholders simultaneously report their types a = {a1,...,a n} and the mech-
anism determines (1) the new control structure c(a)={c1,...,c n}; (2) the new ownership structure
s(a)={s1,...,s n}; and (3) transfer payments to shareholders t(a)={t1,...,t n}. We assume that
ci ∈ {0,1},w h e r eci = 1 implies that shareholder i has control (so that π = ai)a n dci =0i m p l i e s
that he does not have control. We call hc,s,ti a restructuring mechanism.
We restrict attention to mechanisms that are budget balanced. This requires
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨











where K ≥ 0 is constant and represents the exogenous direct cost of restructuring that must be
borne by the shareholders. This might consist of costs arising from regulations, trading costs,
raising funds to place a takeover bid, etc. In a world with no exogenous transaction costs, K =0 .




1i f ai =˜ a
0i f ai < ˜ a.
(4)
However, this condition is not suﬃcient for the mechanism to yield eﬃciency. It must also preclude
agency costs ex post. Speciﬁcally, the ex post manager must have a suﬃciently large ownership
s h a r et h a th ed o e sn o td i v e r tp r o ﬁts. Letting s
ci
i be the ownership share of partner i conditional
on his control ci, condition (2) implies that the following necessary condition must hold as well:
s1
i ≥ δ0(0) ≡ s. (5)
Thus, eﬃciency alone does not impose any constraint on the shares s0
i received by shareholder i
when i does not assume control, but it does require that shareholder i’s controlling share, s1
i,m u s t
14Since types are continuous, the case where two shareholders tie for highest type is a zero probability event and
can be ignored.
9exceed s.15












i to be idiosyncratic across shareholders but assume that s0
i is independent of the
identity of shareholder j 6= i who is assigned control. This assumption greatly simpliﬁes the analysis
and is without loss of generality in the current setting, where all shareholders have the same ability
distribution F.
Budget balance and Lemma 1 impose the following restrictions on s. This and the subsequent
proofs are in the Appendix unless they are very short.































All of our results are derived under unanimity voting. This rule maximizes the likelihood of ﬁnd-
ing fully eﬃcient restructuring mechanisms, because it completely eliminates the free-riding eﬀect
identiﬁed by Grossman and Hart (1980). Thus, whenever fully-eﬃcient restructuring is possible, it
must be possible under a unanimity rule. In this sense, our approach is without loss of generality.
H o w e v e r ,i ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a t ,w h e ni ti sn o tp o s s i b l et oa c h i e v et h eﬁrst-best, the una-
nimity rule is ineﬃcient, because it may block Pareto-improving changes that lead to second-best
outcomes.
3.5 Incentive compatibility and individual rationality
Let −i ≡ N \ i, a−i ≡ {a1,...,ai−1,a i+1,...,a n} and E−i {.} denote the expectation operator with
respect to a−i. Under the mechanism, shareholder i expects to receive transfer Ti (ai) ≡ E−i {ti (a)}.
On top of the transfer, he expects to be allocated control with some probability and expects to own
15It is possible that other, exogenous forces, may require a minimum managerial ownership share as well. For
instance, s could be aﬀected by legal or institutional forces that govern the required minimum share necessary for
acquiring control. For instance, if a corporation is required to dissolve, then s =1 .
10some shares ex post. Let G ≡ Fn−1 be the distribution of the largest of the other shareholders’
abilities, ˜ a−i ≡ max{a1,...,a i−1,a i+1,...,a n}, with corresponding density g. Thus, under an ex post







In contrast, if no mechanism were put into place, the initial ownership and control structure would
be kept intact and the shareholders would expect to receive the following dividends:
(
U1(a1)=β(r1)a1
Ui(ai)=( 1− γ∗(r1))riµ for all i ∈ {2,...,n},
(8)
where β(r1) ≡ δ(γ∗(r1)) + (1 − γ∗(r1))r1. These payoﬀs form the basis for (interim) individually
rational participation, which we require the mechanism to satisfy. That is, unless
Ui(ai) ≥ Ui(ai), (9)
shareholder i prefers the original ownership and control structure to remain intact and (we assume)
can eﬀectively block any transfers of ownership and control.
Because types (abilities) are private information, a mechanism must be incentive compatible to
yield allocative eﬃciency:






for all i ∈ N, ai,b ∈ [a,a]. That is, conditional on all other shareholders declaring their types
truthfully to the mechanism, shareholder i must ﬁnd it optimal to do the same. The next lemma
expresses this condition in a more convenient form.
Lemma 3 A restructuring mechanism hc,s,ti that assigns control to the shareholder with the
highest announced ability is incentive compatible if and only if, for every i ∈ N and for all ai,b∈
[a,a],






Incentive compatibility guarantees that a mechanism that assigns control to the shareholder
with the highest announced ability yields the eﬃcient assignment of control, as in (4). To see
the intuition for this result, consider Ui (b) as given in expression (10). The eﬀect of a marginal






+ dTi (b)/db. Absent transfers, then, Ui (b)
is maximized when b = ais1
i/s0
i. Thus, if the mechanism is such that shareholder i expects to
11receive more shares if he gains control than if he does not (i.e., if s1
i >s 0
i), without transfers this
shareholder would have an incentive to misrepresent himself as having a somewhat higher type. To
counteract this incentive and induce shareholder i to reveal his type truthfully, the transfers under
the mechanism must then be decreasing in ability, as shown in (11). Similarly, if s0
i >s 1
i, transfers
must be increasing in ability.16
Incentive compatibility also completely pins down the shapes of the transfer functions, leaving
undetermined only the set of ﬁxed components in {Ti(ai)}. This implies that, with the help of
external subsidies to guarantee participation, one can always implement an incentive compatible
mechanism. On the other hand, if there are no external subsidies, participation can only be guar-
anteed if the expected gains from restructuring are suﬃciently large relative to the informational
rents required to induce truth-telling. In reality, external subsidies are unlikely to be available. On
the contrary, the implementation of a mechanism is likely to generate additional administrative
costs, captured here by K.
Now, notice that an incentive compatible mechanism that yields the ex post eﬃcient assignment
of control will also be individually rational if and only if the “worst-oﬀ type” of each shareholder
i,d e n o t e db ya∗
i, is willing to participate in the mechanism. This type is deﬁned so that his net
utility from the mechanism is the minimum among all possible types:
a∗
i ∈ arg min
ai∈[a,¯ a]
{Ui(ai) − Ui(ai)}. (12)
Since all other possible types of shareholder i expect to gain at least as much as type a∗
i under the
mechanism, it is clear that individual rationality (IR) constraints require the expected eﬃciency
gains from transferring corporate control to the most able manager to be large enough to allow the
mechanism to “bribe” the worst-oﬀ types of every shareholder. The next two lemmas use this fact
to characterize the participation constraints of incentive compatible mechanisms.
Lemma 4 An incentive compatible restructuring mechanism hc,s,ti that assigns control to the

























1 = β(r1)=0 , in which case a∗
1 is any element in
[a,¯ a].
16Notice also the contrast with the literature on dissolving partnerships, where the assumption that s
1
i =1a n d
s
0
i = 0 implies that each shareholder would always have an incentive to announce b = a in the absence of transfers.
12Lemma 4 identiﬁes the worst-oﬀ type of manager and characterizes individual rationality for
him. It has important implications. Note ﬁrst that whenever s0
1 > 0, the mechanism allows the
original manager to keep shares of the ﬁrm even if he loses control. The higher is s0
1, therefore, the
“safer” the mechanism is for the manager. Accordingly, the transfer that his worst-oﬀ type requires
to participate is lower, the higher is his “safeguard” s0
1.
To reduce management entrenchment, generous severance pay packages can be optimal (Al-
mazan and Suarez 2003). Our model has this same feature: we interpret s0
1 as a golden parachute,
such as options granted to a departing manager in case of a change in control. Because granting
golden parachutes is a way to let the departing manager share some of the eﬃciency gains of his
replacement, it reduces his opposition to a change in control.
The next lemma characterizes the individual rationality constraints for the non-controlling
shareholders.
Lemma 5 An incentive compatible restructuring mechanism hc,s,ti that assigns control to the
shareholder with the highest announced ability is individually rational for shareholder i ∈ {2,...,n}
if and only if
Ti(a∗







i = a unless s1
i =0 , in which case a∗
1 is any element in [a,¯ a].
Proof. For i ∈ {2,...,n}, net utility Ui(ai)−Ui(ai) is strictly convex with ﬁrst derivative s1
iG(ai).
Thus, for s1
i > 0, it is increasing in ai for all ai ≥ a. Hence a∗
i = a. Participation is individually





Ti (a) ≥ (1 − γ∗(r1))riµ, which is equivalent to condition (14).
If s1
i =0 , then Ui(ai) − Ui(ai)h a saﬁrst derivative of zero. Hence all types have the same net
utility. For any a∗
i ∈ [a,¯ a], we must have Ti(a∗





The intuition behind this result is simple. The worst-oﬀ type of a non-controlling shareholder
has the lowest possible managerial ability a.17 Such a shareholder knows that, under the mechanism,
h ew i l le n du pw i t hap a y o ﬀ of s0
i
R ¯ a
a udG(u), while he expects to receive (1 − γ∗(r1))riµ if he does
not participate. Thus, he participates only if he expects to receive a monetary transfer that is at
least as large as the diﬀerence between those two values.
17Except where we mention them speciﬁcally, we ignore in the text the uninteresting multiplicity of worst-oﬀ types
arising in the boundary cases of lemmas 4 and 5.
13Lemma 5 illustrates an eﬀect that is similar to the free-riding behavior of non-controlling share-
holders analyzed by Grossman and Hart (1980): non-controlling shareholders, who do not con-
tribute for production, will hold on to their shares unless they are paid a premium over their
current value. In Grossman and Hart’s speciﬁc bidding game, the price paid per share had to be
at least equal to the share price after the change in control. Because we focus on the set of all
implementable eﬃcient mechanisms, we ﬁnd that free-riding by non-controlling shareholders can be
mitigated by means of considerably smaller price premia. Due to the unanimity rule, this premium
is zero. But even when outside shareholders receive no rents from selling their shares, unless they
get at least the value of their shares in the status quo case, they will block eﬃciency-enhancing
changes of control. Thus, participation of outside shareholders remains a problem, even when they
are pivotal.
4 Conditions for Eﬃcient Restructuring
We begin our analysis of the feasibility of eﬃcient restructuring with a general characterization
result. We then brieﬂy discuss a key corollary, which foreshadows one of our main results: whereas
the level of managerial ownership matters for eﬃciency, the distribution of ownership among non-
controlling shareholders is irrelevant. For ease of explanation, we start by taking the ex post
ownership structure s, or share rule, as given. We then derive the optimal share rule later in the
section.
4.1 Exogenous ex post share rules
Note that conditions (4), (6), (11), (13) and (14) are necessary and suﬃcient to ensure that there
is an eﬃcient restructuring mechanism that is both individually rational and incentive compatible
for all types of all shareholders. We use them to characterize the set of all ex ante and ex post
structures for which an eﬃcient restructuring mechanism achieves budget balance.
Proposition 1 Ac o r p o r a t i o nhr,F,δi can be eﬃciently restructured with an incentive compatible,
individually rational mechanism with share rule s if and only if s satisﬁe sl e m m a s1a n d2a n d

























¯ a,0} − (1 − γ∗(r1))(1 − r1)µ (16)
14and {a∗
i} are as deﬁn e di nl e m m a s4a n d5 .
Condition (15) compares V (r,s), the expected gains from trade minus the informational rents
generated by restructuring mechanism hc,s,ti, to its operating costs K ≥ 0. Whenever condition
(15) holds, any “wrong” initial allocation of control can be eﬃciently corrected by a mechanism
with share rule s. On the other hand, if it is not met, then mechanism hc,s,ti will either not be
able to achieve ex post eﬃciency or will require an outside subsidy.
To analyze the consequences of Proposition 1, it proves convenient to adopt the following
deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 For restructuring mechanism hc,s,ti, the net surplus of the mechanism is V (r,s).
Alternatively, the net friction of the mechanism is V fb− V (r,s).
Studying properties of the net surplus V allows us to characterize the eﬀects of ownership r on
the eﬃciency of the market for corporate control. A larger V implies that eﬃcient restructuring is
possible for larger values of K a n dy i e l d sas u r p l u st h a ti sc l o s e rt oV fb.I n t u i t i v e l y ,V fb− V (r,s)
represents friction in the market for corporate control because it measures the extent to which
informational rents reduce the surplus available to induce participation by the pivotal worst-oﬀ
types of shareholders.
Now, note that the distribution of ownership rights among non-controlling shareholders does
not enter (16).
Corollary 1 The initial distribution of shares among non-controlling shareholders, (r2,...,r n),d o e s
not aﬀect the net surplus, V (r,s).
This is a simple yet very strong result. It implies, in particular, that whether non-controlling
shareholders are initially large or small is irrelevant for whether a particular share rule implements
eﬃcient restructuring.
4.2 Optimal mechanisms
The characterization result of Proposition 1 tells us little about the types of mechanisms corpora-
tions will actually use to restructure. Assuming shareholders can bargain together and implement
their decisions eﬀectively, they will choose s to maximize ex post ﬁrm value. When eﬃcient re-
structuring is possible, they will limit themselves to the set of share rules capable of achieving V fb.
In this subsection, we give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for whether this set is non-empty,
that is, for whether corporation hr,F,δi can be eﬃciently restructured. The key instrument is a
particular share rule, deﬁned next, which is in this set if and only if it is non-empty.




where B is the set of all share rules that satisfy the balanced budget conditions in lemmas 1 and 2.
An optimal restructuring mechanism is an incentive compatible, individually rational, ex post
eﬃcient mechanism with ex post share rule s(r1).
Note that, in light of Corollary 1, we replace r by r1 in the argument of V . The continuity of
the value function, V (r1,s(r1)), follows from the theorem of the maximum, while the existence
of optimal restructuring mechanisms follows from the continuity of V (r1,s) with respect to s and
from the fact that B is a non-empty compact set.
The next proposition describes the properties and pivotal nature of the optimal share rule.
Proposition 2 A corporation hr,F,δi can be eﬃciently restructured if and only if V (r1,s(r1)) ≥ K,





n−1 for all i 6=1 .
ii. s1
i(r1)=s for all i 6=1 .
iii. s0
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a udF(u)n < 0




a udF(u)n > 0.
Otherwise, s1
1(r1) ∈ [s,1] is interior and satisﬁes
Z ¯ a
aw










.I na n yc a s e ,s1
1(r1) ≥ r1,w i t hs1
1(r1) >r 1 for r1 ∈ (0,1).
The optimal share rule treats the manager and the non-controlling shareholders quite diﬀer-
ently.18 The reason is that the identity of the worst-oﬀ type of manager depends crucially on his
18While the optimal sharing rule, s(r1), is unique, there will typically be a multiplicity of optimal mechanisms
that yield V (r1,s(r1))). This is because in general there is a multiplicity of transfer rules t consistent with incentive
compatibility and individual rationality. The diﬀerences between these transfer rules are trivial, however–recall that




1, while the identities of the worst-oﬀ types of non-controlling shareholders do
not depend on their ex post shares at all.
Hypothetically, if there were no budget balance requirements, increasing any ”losing” share, s0
i,
would unambiguously increase V, as such a change clearly increases the sum of expected transfers
to the worst-oﬀ types (see equation (16)). Given budget balance, however, the optimal share rule
increases those values in {s0
i} which have a greater positive eﬀect on V . A ni n c r e a s ei nt h es u m
of ”losing” shares for the non-controlling shareholders,
P
i6=1 s0
i, lowers the ”winning” share of
the original manager, s1








has a higher ability. As a result, the net surplus from restructuring from the perspective of the
worst-oﬀ type of manager is reduced. In contrast, an increase in the manager’s golden parachute,
s0
1, does not aﬀect the identities of the worst-oﬀ types of other shareholders and, therefore, does
not aﬀect the surplus from restructuring. Accordingly, the optimal share rule speciﬁes s0
1(r1) ≥
s0
i(r1).19 Similarly, because a larger s1
1 yields a smaller a∗
1 (so that this type expects greater gains
from restructuring), while larger values of {s1
i}i6=1 do not change {a∗




Note that there is, essentially, an ”optimal” worst-oﬀ type of manager aw, given by condition
(17). V (r1,s)i sc o n c a v ei ns1
1, so when it is possible to choose s1
1(r1) ∈ [s,1] such that (17) holds,
then a∗
1 = aw and we say that s1
1(r1)i sinterior.W h e n s > 0a n dr1 is small, the value of s1
1
that sets a∗
1 = aw may be infeasibly low, in which case the corner solution s1
1(r1)=s arises (and
a∗
1 <a w). On the other hand, when r1 is large, the value of s1
1 that sets a∗
1 = aw may be infeasibly
high, in which case s1
1(r1) = 1 is optimal (and a∗
1 >a w).21
While clearly having normative implications, the properties of the optimal share rule also have
several positive implications for corporate restructuring. Key features of s(r1) are chosen precisely
to ensure the manager’s participation in restructuring. The golden parachute serves as a particularly
eﬀective tool–each of the non-controlling shareholders’ winning shares is kept at s to ensure the
largest possible s0
1. Thus, our analysis indicates that there may be strong eﬃciency reasons for
sweetening a severance package to convince a CEO to participate in a restructuring. This may also
help to explain why deposed CEOs frequently receive stock and/or stock options as part of their
severance pay.
The optimal share rule has the property that restructuring does not lead to convergence of man-
agerial ownership. If the manager remains in control after the operation of an optimal mechanism,
19Since any non-controlling shareholder receives an ex post managerial share s, set just large enough to preclude

















1(r1)], which holds as long as s
1
1(r1) ≥ s.
21The case r1 =0 ,s= 0 is special because the worst-oﬀ type a
∗
1 can be any a ∈ [a,a]f o rt h eo p t i m a ls
1
1(0) = 0.
17his ownership stake will typically increase. However, if he is deposed, the new manager’s ownership
is set at s, which will often be smaller than r1. Thus, we should expect to see CEOs with long
tenures increase their ownership stakes through time, but should see managerial ownership reduced
when a long-tenured CEO is replaced.
4.2.1 Complete dissolution
The nature of optimal restructuring also contributes to the literature on partnerships.I n p a s t
work, started by the seminal contribution of Cramton et al. (1987), the typical nature of payoﬀs
to the partners is diﬀerent than to our shareholders. Most notably, control is not modeled, so
agency costs do not emerge and complete dissolution is the only ex post share rule that yields an
eﬃcient outcome. Here, by contrast, ex post eﬃciency depends on the assignment of control and on
whether ex post managerial ownership precludes agency costs. In this context, complete dissolution
is typically suboptimal.
Corollary 2 The optimal share rule speciﬁes complete dissolution (s1
i =1and s0
i =0for all i) if
and only if agency costs are extreme, δ0(0) = 1 .
Proof. We show in the proof of Proposition 2 that V (r1,s)i si n c r e a s i n gi ns0
1. Therefore, unless
s =1 , the optimal s0
1 is strictly positive, and s1
i < 1 for at least one i =1 ,...,n. We know that
s =1i fa n do n l yi fδ0(0) = 1.
Thus, complete dissolution is optimal if and only if it is the only share rule that prevents agency
costs ex post. It follows directly that, when agency costs are less than extreme, complete dissolution
may fail to implement V fb in situations where s(r1) will do so. In such situations, partnerships are
unlikely to completely dissolve. Thus, our theory complements that of Cramton et al. (1987) by
oﬀering an explanation both for the persistence of a partnership structure and for the conditions
under which dissolution may emerge endogenously.
4.3 Ownership structure and the possibility of eﬃcient restructuring
It follows directly from Corollary 1 that the possibility of eﬃcient restructuring does not depend
on the initial distribution of ownership among non-controlling shareholders, since the only charac-
teristic of r that aﬀects the optimal share rule is r1. While that distribution does aﬀect whether
the trivial mechanism implements eﬃcient restructuring, as discussed earlier, it does not matter
for the size of V (r1,s(r1)).
18In contrast, the ex ante level of managerial ownership, r1, is a key determinant of V (r1,s(r1))
and, consequently, of the possibility of eﬃcient restructuring. It determines the severity of the
participation constraints of non-controlling shareholders, the ex ante level of agency costs, and the
worst-oﬀ type of manager, both directly and through inﬂuencing s(r1)i na no p t i m a lm e c h a n i s m .
Thus, it has strong positive implications for ﬁrm value.
To begin analyzing the impact of r1,w eh o l ds ﬁxed, as in Proposition 1. It is clear from
(16) that there are three channels through which managerial ownership directly aﬀects eﬃciency.
First, agency costs aside, an increase in managerial ownership r1 slacks the outside shareholders’
participation constraints, increasing V (r1,s) by a factor of µ at the margin. Larger initial shares for
non-controlling shareholders (and thus lower initial managerial ownership) make it more expensive
to induce the participation of low-ability non-controlling shareholders. Thus, low levels of initial
managerial ownership may have adverse eﬃciency eﬀects, because eﬃcient transfers of control are
less likely to be feasible when the minimum compensation for the non-controlling shareholder–
as represented in the last term of equation (16)–is larger. We refer to this force as the outside
shareholder participation eﬀect: it becomes easier to induce the participation of outside shareholders
in a mechanism that reallocates control as the initial stake in the hands of insiders increases.
However, when agency costs are present, an increase in r1 decreases perquisites γ∗(r1). This
signiﬁcantly alters the outside shareholder participation eﬀect, because perquisite-taking shrinks
the size of the aggregate participation constraint, (1−γ∗(r1))(1−r1)µ, and makes it non-monotonic
as a function of r1 (it is 0 for both r1 =0a n dr1 =1 ) . Indeed, when agency costs are accounted
for, the outside shareholder participation eﬀect is positive if and only if (1 − γ∗(r1))(1 − r1)µ is
decreasing in r1.
Finally, r1 has a negative eﬀect on V (r1,s) because a higher r1 implies a higher worst-oﬀ type
a∗
1 for the original manager, which in turn reduces the expected gains from restructuring available
to bribe that type under the mechanism. A larger a∗
1 makes it harder to satisfy the IR constraint
for the worst-oﬀ type of the incumbent manager. Intuitively, the worst-oﬀ type of the incumbent
manager knows that he will get the least informational rent. Thus, his main incentive to participate
is his expectation of sharing some of the eﬃciency gains through his ex post ownership of shares
s1
1 or s0
1. But if his ability is high, these expected eﬃciency gains are small. Thus, as managerial
ownership increases, so does management resistance to changes. In line with previous literature,
we call this the management entrenchment eﬀect.
Since this eﬀect is unambiguously negative, it is clear that when the outside shareholder par-
ticipation eﬀect is also negative, V decreases with r1. When the latter is positive, there is some
ambiguity about whether it dominates the management entrenchment eﬀect. These eﬀects are






µ +( 1− γ∗(r1))(µ − a∗
1). (18)
When no agency costs are present, γ∗ = 0 and this expression reduces to µ − a∗
1. In this case,
V is increasing in r1 if and only if the outside shareholder participation eﬀect, µ, dominates the
management entrenchment eﬀect, −a∗
1. When agency costs are present, these eﬀects change because
agency costs change with r1.T h e ﬁrst term in (18) is unambiguously negative, while the second
term is negative whenever a∗
1 >µ .Thus, a suﬃcient condition for V being everywhere decreasing
in r1 is that a∗
1 >µ .
Now consider how managerial ownership aﬀects the possibility of eﬃcient restructuring through
its eﬀects on the optimal share rule. We show that there is a level of managerial ownership ˆ r1 < 1
such that, if ownership is greater than ˆ r1, the management entrenchment eﬀect always dominates.
Proposition 3 There is a ˆ r1 < 1 such that V (r1,s(r1)) is strictly decreasing in r1 for r1 > ˆ r1.
Furthermore, if δ(1) ≥ δ0(0)G(µ), ˆ r1 =0 .
At an intuitive level, the suﬃcient condition for V to be decreasing everywhere is that the
extraction of all private beneﬁts is not ”too ineﬃcient” (relative to the extraction of small amounts),
so that
δ(1)
δ0(0) is suﬃciently large. Interestingly, this always includes the case of no agency costs but,
depending on G(µ), may not include the case of extreme agency costs.
Next, we deﬁne the set of ownership structures for which eﬃcient restructuring is possible and
prove several results related to the characterization of this set.
Deﬁnition 4 Let Φ = {r1|V (r1,s(r1)) ≥ K} be the set of all r1 for which eﬃcient restructuring is
possible.
Proposition 4 If δ0(0) = 0 and K =0 , then Φ =[ 0 ,1].
Thus, if there are no agency costs and no direct restructuring costs, eﬃcient restructuring is
always possible, because the trivial mechanism will always work. This result yields a subtle, yet
important contribution to the broader mechanism design literature. To see this, note that bilateral
exchange is a special type of restructuring that emerges in our model when ex ante managerial
ownership is extreme (r1 =1 ) . Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) show that eﬃcient exchange under
budget balance is impossible for symmetric continuous types of the buyer and seller. However, they
do not explicitly model the exchange of control. We show that, when this is considered, and the asset
20in question is divisible, the constraint imposed (on eﬃcient exchange) by extreme ownership changes
signiﬁcantly. The following corollary recasts the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility result.
Corollary 3 Let r1 =1 . In this case, the corporation can be eﬃciently restructured if and only if




i =0for i 6=1 .
Proof. We know from Proposition 2 that the optimal mechanism assigns s1
1(1) = 1. Thus,
V (r1,s(1)) collapses to




which is strictly negative unless s =0 .I fs =0 ,V (1,s(1)) = 0 as well, and eﬃcient restructuring
is impossible unless K =0 .
Hence, it is actually possible to eﬃciently restructure when r1 =1 , but if and only if the
trivial mechanism works (that is, if and only if the seller can retain full ownership when keeping or
surrendering control) and the complete separation of control from ownership introduces no agency
costs and entails no direct costs of restructuring. When this holds, Φ =[ 0 ,1] from Proposition
4. Note that, for s =1a n dn =2 ,V(1,s(1)) collapses to the minimum outside subsidy required
to implement eﬃcient bilateral exchange in the Myerson-Satterthwaite setting.22 Indeed, their
setting can be interpreted as a nested, special case of our model when r1 =1a n dδ0(0) = 1. Since
V (r1,s)i si n c r e a s i n gi ns0
1, it follows directly that, when δ0(0) < 1 and both control and ownership
are tradeable, eﬃcient bilateral exchange requires a smaller outside subsidy than Myerson and
Satterthwaite identiﬁed, so long as the “seller” (manager) retains some ownership shares when the
“buyer” (a non-controlling shareholder) assumes control ex post.
The next two results (which are corollaries of Proposition 3) show that eﬃcient restructuring is
typically more diﬃcult to achieve when managerial ownership is high.
Corollary 4 If δ0(0) > 0, then Φ =[ 0 ,r0
1], with r0
1 < 1,i fδ(1) ≥ δ0(0)G(µ) and Φ is non-empty.
Proof. When r1 =1w eh a v e




which is negative (and thus lower than K) if and only if δ0(0) > 0. Since ˆ r1 =0w h e nδ0(0) > 0,
δ(1) ≥ δ0(0)G(µ), and Φ is non-empty, continuity and monotonicity of V yield the existence of
r0
1 ∈ [0,1).
22See Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983, p. 272, equation (7)).
21If there are agency costs, eﬃcient restructuring may not be possible for any r1. This corollary
shows, however, that if there are some levels of ownership for which eﬃcient restructuring is possible
and extraction of all private beneﬁts is not too ineﬃcient, then we can be quite precise with our
characterization of Φ:e ﬃcient restructuring is possible if and only if r1 ≤ r0
1 < 1. Thus, suﬃciently
high levels of managerial ownership preclude eﬃcient restructuring.
The following corollary strengthens the suﬃcient condition for monotonicity of V in Proposition
3 by showing that the management entrenchment eﬀect always dominates when the number of
shareholders is ”large.”
Corollary 5 For suﬃciently large n, ˆ r1 =0and Φ =[ 0 ,r0
1] if it is non-empty, where r0
1 < 1.
Proof. Clearly, ˆ r1 =0f o ra l ln if δ0(0) = 0. If δ0(0) > 0, then V (r1,s(r1)) is strictly decreasing in
r1 if
δ(1)
δ0(0) ≥ G(µ)=F(µ)n−1. Since µ<¯ a, the latter expression decreases with n and has limn→∞
F(µ)n−1 =0<
δ(1)
δ0(0), completing the proof.
Notice that this result holds for any private extraction function δ(γ). Thus, the characterization
result for Φ is quite general.
This set of results puts the conﬂict between the moral hazard problem and the adverse selection
problem in striking relief. A low level of ex ante managerial ownership is bad for incentives but good
for the operation of the market for corporate control, so it aggravates the moral hazard problem but
mitigates the adverse selection problem. For suﬃciently high r1, when the market for control fails
to yield eﬃciency, second-best alternatives dictate (sometimes) keeping a less-qualiﬁed manager
who will not divert proﬁts or recruiting a more qualiﬁed manager who will extract some private
beneﬁts. As we have shown, while each problem in isolation can be overcome through the market for
corporate control, private beneﬁts and asymmetric information jointly create endogenous frictions
which, in some cases, cannot be overcome. Most importantly, they make managerial ownership the
crucial determinant of the eﬃciency of this market and, hence, a key determinant of ﬁrm value.
5A n E x a m p l e
To illustrate our results, consider an example where shareholder abilities are distributed uniformly,








22Figure 1: Net Surplus, n = 2, diﬀerent alphas




α if r1 < α
0i f r1 ≥ α,
so that s = α. Substituting into (16) for the uniform distribution (so that G(a)=an−1) and using
















































if r1 ≥ α.
The optimal s1
1 also identiﬁes the worst-oﬀ type of manager:
23We omit the case where r1 = s =0 .
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Figure 1 shows V (r1,s(r1)) as a function of r1 for α ∈ {.01,.5,1} and n =2 . N o t et h a tV







.V is not monotone in α,
however. When α = .01, the (negative) slope of V is most severe when r1 <. 01. This is due
to the fact that the participation constraints for the non-controlling shareholders increase rapidly
(as perquisite-taking falls) with r1–that is, outside shareholder participation eﬀect, net of agency
costs, is strongly negative for very small r1.W h e nα = .5, this phenomenon holds as well, but is
less marked. When α =1 , the participation constraints rise until r1 = .5, then fall. This is why
V is convex for small r1 but concave for large r1. In all three cases, Φ is non-empty, so eﬃcient
restructuring is possible for a closed interval of r1. This interval is largest for α = .01 ([0,.996])
and smallest for α =1( [ 0 ,.56]).
Now consider the trade-oﬀ of raising r1. When α = .01, there are no agency costs ex ante for
r1 ∈ [.01,1] and eﬃcient restructuring is possible for r1 ∈ [0,.996], so expected ﬁrm value under
24both the status quo and under restructuring is maximized for r1 ∈ [.01,.996]. For α = .5, the
region where both values are maximized shrinks to [.5,.78]. No such range exists for α =1 . Thus,
suﬃciently extreme agency costs entails either an status quo loss of value or an ex post loss of
value.
Figure 2 shows V (r1,s(r1)) as a function of r1 for n ∈ {2,5,10} and α =1 . Again, V is
everywhere decreasing in r1. Clearly, V is increasing in n as well. If n =2 , eﬃcient restructuring
is possible only if r1 ≤ .54, while if n = 10, it is possible for r1 ≤ .83.
Corollary 4 and this example suggest that the negative impact of agency costs on ﬁrm value
will be mitigated when managerial ownership is small. Generally, since agency problems increase
the surplus from restructuring, they make it more likely that optimal ex post ﬁrm value is possible
under restructuring. Consistent with many other works (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976), in our
model agency costs are higher when managerial ownership is small. This supports the contention
that agency costs make takeovers or other restructurings more likely in situations when managerial
ownership stake is small.
6 Discussion
6.1 Understanding the main results
Agency problems due to the existence of non-veriﬁable actions by managers can be mitigated by
giving managers large ownership stakes. However, we show that this goal conﬂicts with the ex
post ownership structure that facilitates the operation of the market for corporate control. The
provision of golden parachutes to departing managers is required to alleviate their resistance to
restructurings; however, if more shares are given to departing managers, fewer are available for the
new manager. Thus, the optimal ownership structure targeted by a restructuring mechanism must
represent a compromise between two conﬂicting goals: providing incentives to new managers to
maximize ﬁrm value and reducing incumbent management resistance to change.
The original ownership structure also aﬀects this trade-oﬀ. If initial managerial ownership is
large, the management entrenchment problem is severe and the role of golden parachutes as a fa-
cilitator of change becomes more important. Ownership structure is therefore not neutral: a large
managerial ownership means that incentives for taking value-reducing actions by current manage-
ment are small, but in that case the incumbent manager is more likely to oﬀer resistance to takeover
attempts. In fact, high levels of management ownership can preclude eﬃcient transfers of control,
even when contracts for transferring control are complete. In our model, asymmetric information
about managerial talent coupled with ineﬃcient extraction of private beneﬁts are suﬃcient to gen-
25erate management resistance to control changes. In such a case, as the managerial block increases,
the overall surplus generated by a mechanism for transferring control decreases, reducing the rents
available to induce managers to participate in such a mechanism.
6.2 Interpretation of the model
The model we present in this paper is very general but also very abstract. Thus, it is important to
clarify what it can and what it cannot explain.
The model is not designed to explain the details of existing mechanisms of transferring control,
such as proxy ﬁghts, tender oﬀers, or mergers. Thus, it would also be misleading to use the results
of our analysis to predict the outcomes of such mechanisms. There is a large literature that focuses
on modeling and assessing the eﬃciency properties of speciﬁc mechanisms–for example, Grossman
and Hart (1980), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Burkart (1995), Singh (1998), Bulow et al. (1999),
Burkart et al. (2000), and M¨ uller and Panunzi (2004). Our mechanism design approach tells us,
by contrast, what all speciﬁc mechanisms cannot achieve. Therefore, our approach teaches us
something about the bounds and limits of the mechanisms that form the market for corporate
control. We have shown that there are ownership structures that cannot be eﬃciently restructured
by any incentive-compatible mechanism. We see this result as a fundamental property of the market
for corporate control. A direct implication is that one will never be able to fully eliminate the joint
problems of management entrenchment and the lack of managerial incentives to maximize proﬁts
as long as information asymmetries remain in place.
A feature of our model that might seem too restrictive is the requirement that all shareholders
must choose to participate for any change in control to occur. Thus, any shareholder, however
small, can alone block a deal that could increase ﬁrm value substantially. This assumption is
not as strong as it seems, however. The reason is two-fold. First, although a small shareholder
cannot alone block a control transaction, the similar non-cooperative behavior of many dispersed
shareholders can indeed block control changes, as Grossman and Hart (1980) point out. Thus,
ignoring the participation constraints of small shareholders is generally not appropriate to achieve
eﬃciency. The task of meeting the participation constraints of dispersed shareholders is in fact often
the main diﬃculty in implementing a successful takeover bid. Secondly, and most importantly, our
approach is not aimed at mimicking actual institutions, but rather at showing their limitations.
When there are no mechanisms such that all participation constraints hold simultaneously, trade
could still occur, as some shareholders can simply hold on to their shares or be forced to sell them
(as in squeeze-out rules). However, no information can be gathered from them, since no one can
be forced to reveal his private information. Because the mechanism would have to allocate control
26without full information, eﬃciency would not be achieved with certainty. We impose the condition
of voluntary participation under unanimity precisely because we want to characterize the set of all
ex ante eﬃcient mechanisms of reallocating ownership and control.
6.3 Final remarks
Our model provides an integrative framework under which the interplay between management
entrenchment and agency costs can be studied under very general conditions. The market for
corporate control is modeled in a way that allows it to achieve the eﬃcient outcome whenever
possible. Nevertheless, we show that information asymmetries and hidden actions create sometimes
inescapable diﬃculties to the functioning of this market.
It should be emphasized that our theoretical framework constitutes both a departure (as it
distinguishes between ownership and control) and a generalization (as it allows for agency costs) of
Cramton et al. (1987). As such, it can be applied to various other settings as well. In particular,
our analysis raises several issues worth of future consideration. For example, in situations where
no mechanism yields ex post eﬃcient restructuring, it is to be expected that corporations will seek
“second best” mechanisms that achieve restructuring with some loss in allocative eﬃciency. In
considering this explicitly, it would become possible to form a stronger link between the market for
corporate control and ﬁrm value. We leave this extension for future research.
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P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . Only if. If the mechanism assigns control to the highest announced type,





For convenience, deﬁne Si(ai) ≡ s1
iG(ai)a n dPi(ai) ≡ s0
i
R ¯ a
ai udG(u). Then, given condition
(7), we have Ui (ai)=aiSi(ai)+Pi(ai)+Ti(ai). Incentive compatibility (condition (10)) requires
Ui (ai) ≥ aiSi(b)+Pi(b)+Ti(b) for all i,ai,b∈ [a,a]. We have
Ui (ai)=aiSi(ai)+Pi(ai)+Ti(ai)
≥ aiSi(b)+Pi(b)+Ti(b)
= Ui(b)+aiSi(b) − bSi(b).






















where the second line uses a simple integration by parts. Using condition (7) for Ui(ai)a n dUi(b)




































Adding these terms to (11), we have
ais1




(ai − u)dG(u) ≥ 0.




which is the incentive compatibility condition given by (10). Note also that this implies that utility




ai udG(u)+Ti (ai), so that the mechanism assigns control to
the highest announced type.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . From condition (23), we have that the diﬀerence U1(a1)−U1(a1)i sc o n v e x
and has ﬁrst derivative s1
1G(a1) − δ(γ∗(r1)) − (1 − γ∗(r1))r1.T h u s ,i fs1
1 ≥ β(r1)a n ds1
1 > 0,a ∗
1 is








1 < β(r1), then s1
1G(a1) − δ(γ∗(r1)) − (1 − γ∗(r1))r1 < 0 for all a1 ∈ [a,¯ a]a n dU1(a1) − U1(a1)
is minimized at a∗
1 =¯ a. Finally, if s1
1 = β(r1) = 0, all a1 ∈ [a,¯ a] expect to gain the same under the
mechanism, so any type will do the role of the worst-oﬀ type.











1.T h u s ,i fs1
1 ≥ r1 and s1

























(It is straightforward to see that this condition also holds for s1
1 = β(r1) = 0, only that in
such a case a∗






¯ a,0} =0w h e ns1
1 ≥ β(r1). If s1
1 < β(r1), participation is individually ratio-
nal for the original manager if and only if
s1
1¯ aG(¯ a)+T1 (¯ a) ≥ β(r1)¯ a,
which simpliﬁes to
T1(¯ a) ≥ (β(r1) − s1
1)¯ a.




1 udG(u)=0w h e na∗
1 =¯ a.
For all subsequent proofs, let {a∗
i} be deﬁn e da si nl e m m a s4a n d5 .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Only if. From condition (11), incentive compatibility of a mechanism









































































where the second line is obtained by changing the order of integration. Because of budget balance,
Pn
i=1 ti = −K, it must be true that the sum of expected transfers is −K as well :
Pn
i=1 Ei{Ti(ai)} =










































i6=1 ri =1 −r1.U s i n gt h ee x p r e s s i o nf o r
Pn
i=1 Ti(a∗



















− max{(β(r1) − s1
1)¯ a,0} − (1 − γ∗(r1))(1 − r1)µ ≥ K.






































This guarantees that the mechanism is incentive compatible and that it assigns control to the
shareholder with the highest announced ability. Thus, by showing that it is also individually






















Since equation (15) asserts that
V (r,s) − K ≥ 0,
we can choose


























































With some simple algebra using the deﬁnition of V (r,s), it can be shown that
Pn
i=1 ci = −K. We
have
T1(a∗










































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . We ﬁrst identify s(r1), then prove the “if and only if” statement. In
identifying s(r1), it is easiest to ﬁrst prove part iii, followed by parts ii,i and iv.
(Part iii)C o n s i d e rﬁrst the manager’s golden parachute, s0
1. The budget balance conditions of











out of expression (16), so V (r1,s)m a y










(n − 1)(1 − s0

























=( n − 1)
Z ¯ a
a
[1 − F(u)]G(u)du > 0, (28)
where the second line uses the fact that G(u)=F(u)n−1. Clearly, then, net surplus is maximized
for the largest possible s0
1 that is compatible with s1















≥ (n − 1)s. (29)
The left-hand side of this inequality is positive when s0
1 = 0 and decreases in s0
1.T h u s ,V (r1,s)i s








1(r1) is also chosen optimally.
(Part ii)T oﬁnd {s1
i(r1)}i6=1,n o t et h a tp a r tiii also implies that
P
i6=1 s1
i =( n−1)s. Since each
s1
i must be at least s,w eh a v et h a ts1
i(r1)=s for i 6=1 .
(Part i)T oﬁnd {s0
i(r1)}i6=1, rewrite (20) isolating the summation on the left-hand side for each
i 6= 1 that may gain control. This gives us the following n − 1 conditions:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨















3 + ... + s0
n−1 =1− s ,
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a ts1
i(r1)=s for all i 6= 1 in the optimal mechanism. It is easy to
see that these conditions are only satisﬁed for
s0
2 = s0
3 = ... = s0
n.






for all i 6=1 .
(Part iv)N e x tc o n s i d e rt h eo p t i m a ls1
1. Using the results from parts i to iii of the proposition,











1 − (n − 1)s
¤Z ¯ a
a




− (1 − γ∗(r1))(1 − r1)µ − max{(β(r1) − s1
1)¯ a,0}. (31)
The s1
1 that maximizes this expression deﬁnes the optimal s1
1 (r1).
33Assume, for the moment, that s =0 .I fr1 =0a n ds1
1 > 0, then a∗













1(r1)=0i fr1 =0a n ds = 0 (this follows from the continuity of V 0).
For positive r1 if s = 0, or for all r1 if s > 0, we will show that it is optimal to have s1
1 >
β(r1) ≥ r1 in this case. Note ﬁrst that, since s1
1 is deﬁned on [s,1], a compact set, if V 0(r1,s 1
1)
is bounded then it must achieve a maximum on this set. To show that the optimal s1
1 is unique
and greater than r1,i ts u ﬃces to show that V 0(r1,s 1
1)i ss t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi ns1
1 when s1
1 ≤ β(r1),
strictly concave for s1
1 > β(r1), and has a continuous ﬁrst derivative and is ﬁnite when s1
1 =1 .
First, when s1








udF(u)n > 0, (32)
so V 0(r1,s 1
1) is increasing and linear in s1
1 in this range. Next, when s1























where the second line follows from a simple integration by parts. Since a∗
1 =¯ a at s1
1 = β(r1) > 0,
this expression collapses to (32) at that point, so the derivative is continuous at s1
1 = β(r1). It is
straightforward to show that V 0(r1,s 1















Finally, since V 0(r1,s 1
1)i sﬁnite when s1
1 =1 ,i ft h e r ee x i s t sa ns1







1 is the unique maximizer of V 0(r1,s 1
1). In that case, the optimal s1
1 is deﬁned implicitly











in which case s1








in which case s1
1 = 1 is the unique maximizer. This completes our identiﬁcation of s(r1).
34To show that a corporation with initial managerial ownership r1 can be eﬃciently restructured
if and only if V (r1,s(r1)) ≥ K,n o t et h a ti fV (r1,s(r1)) ≥ K, the corporation can be eﬃciently
restructured using s(r1), because s(r1)s a t i s ﬁes the budget balance conditions in lemmas 1 and 2, so
there are no agency costs ex post, and V (r1,s(r1)) ≥ K implies that s(r1)y i e l d sa ne ﬃcient transfer
of control by Proposition 1. On the other hand, if the corporation can be eﬃciently restructured,
then V (r1,s) ≥ K for some s that satisﬁes the budget balance conditions in (6). Since V (r1,s(r1)) ≥
V (r1,s) by the deﬁnition of s(r1), we have that V (r1,s(r1)) ≥ K. Since s(r1)s a t i s ﬁes budget balance
as well, the corporation can be eﬃciently restructured using share rule s(r1).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . To prove our results, we begin by showing that aw >µ .
Consider the term
R ¯ a
a udF(u)n. Consider a random variable X that follows F and a random







The expected Z conditional on already knowing a is




By the law of iterated expectations, we then have
E [Z]=Ea [E [Z | a]] = Ea [h(a)].





Now let us go back to the ﬁrst-order condition for an optimal s1
1. Suppose we are in an interior









h(aw) − Ea [h(a)] = 0.
35Notice that h(a) is increasing and convex. Thus, Jensen’s inequality implies that
h(µ) − Ea [h(a)] < 0,
where µ = E [a], thus the value aw that solves
h(aw) − Ea [h(a)] = 0
is such that aw >µ .













= −[1 − γ∗(r1)]a∗
1 −
∙





=( 1 − r1)
dγ∗
dr1
µ +( 1− γ∗(r1))(µ − a∗
1),
where the envelope theorem zeroes out the last term in the ﬁrst line of algebra above.
Consider initially the case where the solution is interior. Since
dγ∗
dr1 = 1
δ00(γ) < 0 by the concavity






µ +( 1− γ∗(r1))(µ − aw) < 0,
where aw is deﬁned in (17), for all r1 such that it holds for a feasible s1
1(r1). Now, if s1
1(r1)=1 ,
then a∗
1 ≥ aw >µ .Thus, if s1
1(r1) >s , then V is clearly decreasing in r1.
Next, suppose that r1 is small enough so that s1
1 = s > 0i so p t i m a l .D i ﬀerentiating expression
(31) when s1















Since β(r1)i si n c r e a s i n gi nr1, the term in square brackets is decreasing in r1. Thus, if this term is











0, then ˆ r1 =0 . Clearly, this holds whenever δ(1) ≥ G(µ)δ0(0).
Finally, consider the boundary case of δ0(0) = 0, so that s = 0 and, for r1 > 0,
dV (r1,s(r1))
dr1
= µ − a∗
1.
The preceding analysis holds, as a∗
1 >µfor all r, implying that V is decreasing everywhere when
δ0 (0) = 0, which implies the condition δ(1) ≥ G(µ)δ0(0). Note that the above derivative holds as
r1 approaches 0, but is undeﬁned at r1 =0 .
36P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Suppose δ0(0) = 0 and K =0 . It suﬃces to show that the trivial
mechanism, where s1
i = s0
i = ri for all i, achieves ex post eﬃciency for all r1.S i n c eδ0(0) = 0, we
have s = 0 and the trivial mechanism’s share rule precludes agency costs ex post. Since s1
i = s0
i for








































Given the trivial mechanism’s share rule, a∗










so that V (r1,st) ≥ 0 for any r1, where st is the share rule for the trivial mechanism. Since
V (r1,s(r1)) ≥ V (r1,st), the proof is complete.
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